The Dolejsi Analysis (1991)
Part Two of Four
By Miroslav Dolejsi
Translated by Jan Malina
Part 2, The November 1989 Revolution
The
Czechoslovak Parliamentary Investigative Committee's report on developments
surrounding the November 17, 1989 Revolution was classified and not released to
the public. The investigation resulted in the sentencing of a handful of
insignificant police officers to a few months of jail time. The investigation
focused on brutalities committed on National Boulevard [in Prague]. The
investigators carefully avoided any mention of the political background of the
revolution. The independent student investigative committee created in response
to the manipulations of the parliament was sidestepped. [Note: The West
understands the 1989 Revolution as an “anti-communist” revolt triggered by
police brutality on November 17.]
The aftermath
of these developments was widespread doubt regarding the nonsense legend of the
“Velvet Revolution.” This nonsense is still being preached by President Havel
and by the Charter 77 government. President Havel did not fulfill his publicly
given promise that all files about meetings between Havel’s group [Charter 77]
and the communist government of Prime Minister Adamec, followed by meetings with
“the decisive political powers,” would be published. In the time frame of a
few months it became obvious that the brutal police response on National
Boulevard was prepared in advance and was meant as a signal for starting the
revolution.
After the
signal was given the initiative passed to Charter 77. This indicates there was
coordination between the communists and Charter 77 in preparing the
revolutionary process. Immediately after the brutality occurred Charter 77 took
matters into its own hands by spreading a rumor [later proved false] through
student Drazska that student Smid was killed [by the police]. This inexplicable
transfer of initiative is a political mystery. It suggests a point of connection
between Charter 77 and a special faction of the Central Committee of the CzCP
[Czechoslovak Communist Party].
Taking into
consideration the doubts of the Czechoslovak people, the BBC shot a documentary
about the November 17 episode in which the revolution was depicted as an
unsuccessful Communist Party coup intended to remove Milos Jakes from the
leadership, but the coup got out of hand. [Jakes was General Secretary of the
CzCP at the time.]
Guided by the
light of this interpretation, founding Charter 77 member Jiri Ruml came up with
a proposal to reinvestigate the November 17, 1989 events. This was problematic
because Charter 77 insiders conducted the investigation and presented the BBC
documentary’s interpretation of the “Velvet Revolution” as accurate. This
version of events was politically acceptable because it effectively covered up
any connection between Charter 77 and the communists. The Charter 77 elite could
still be regarded as something it is not [i.e., a genuine anti-communist
movement].
If the truth
of about the November 1989 Revolution were known, Havel and his Charter 77
government would have to fall. That is not acceptable to the foreign [socialist]
sponsors of Charter 77 who were building it up for 13 years and had no
replacement organization acceptable to the Russians. The government of Havel’s
Charter 77 had to be defended and preserved.
From this
analysis it is possible to present facts, putting them into chronological order,
showing the following sequence: After President-elect George H.W. Bush’s
advisor, John Whitehead, visited Eastern Europe in the fall of 1988,
preparations for the changes were begun. In Czechoslovakia a directive was
issued for Charter 77 to step out and create a number of independent groups
called “independent actors.” These included:
SPUSA [Society of Friends of USA]
HOS [Movement for
Citizens Freedom]
DI [Democratic Initiative]
Revival of
Socialism [union of former communists and secret police STB agents of 1968]
Czech Children [monarchists]
NMS [Independent Peace
Alliance] and others.
All these
groups worked under the leadership of Charter 77. The objective was to create
the impression of larger-scale anti-communist opposition even though it was a
false impression but necessary for a propaganda campaign aimed at the West. [The
Revival of Socialism group consisted of communists and STB agents from the
Prague Spring era of 1968. These were supposed “liberal” communists like Dubcek
and Cernik.]
In the
Central Committee of the CzCP there was a group set up (which included Urbanek
and Mohorita) under the direction Hegenbart to handle meetings with the Revival
of Socialism group. The objective was to coordinate the removal of CzCP
Secretary General Milos Jakes, by compromising him and getting him out of the
way. In his activities Hegenbart was under orders from the KGB.
There was an
amateur documentary film produced that compromised Jakes by showing him in his
public appearance in West Bohemia. The KGB produced many copies of this film and
sold it abroad. At the same time, Hegenbart was isolating Jakes, who was not
briefed about these changes so any un-desirable response [from the communists]
would've been eliminated at the beginning of the operation.
Hegenbart was
also the main person who in July and August of 1989 directed the communist
government's position toward the exodus of East Germans from the West German
Embassy in Prague to West Germany. In terms of co-operation between Hegenbart
and the Revival of Socialism group, Jiri Hajek [Charter 77 founding member]
traveled to Austria just before the revolution to discuss some last minute
details about the date and form the revolution would take. [ Jiri Hajek:
Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party before WW2; he was involved in merging
this party with communists after the 1948 communist coup.]
The November
17th date was chosen as the most preferable because it was the International Day
of Students and this would guarantee an international responses and,
additionally, it was chosen because it was the last available such day with the
possibility of an international response before the Bush-Gorbachev summit in
Malta where the unification of Germany was on the table, requiring the input of
the Czechoslovaks.
The report
published by the Independent Student Investigation Committee explains how the
meeting of Prague's College Council [about the demonstration preparations] was
manipulated regarding the participation of Vasil Mohorita. It is possible to add
following to already known facts about the brutal attacks on National Boulevard:
A)
Approximately two hours before the protest demonstration of students, led by STB
lieutenant Ludvik Zifcak (alias "student Ruzicka”), all public transportation in
the vicinity of the protest was stopped in both directions. The Public
transportation Company [state run] must have received an order to stop all
traffic at least three hours earlier. At the same time National Boulevard was
cleared [no public allowed].
B) Riot police
were in position in Mikulasska and Konviktska [CZ police headquaters] streets
three hours before the arrival of demonstration to National Boulevard.
C) About an
hour before the demonstration began, all buildings were locked up from Pernstyn
to National Theatre, even though the demonstration wasn't supposed to go that
way.
D) Quick
response police unit URNA [comparable to a SWAT team] was ordered to remain at
alert level three [its members were at home with their families but had to be on
call] and received an order at 10:30 AM to report to base; that is, four hours
before the demonstration began. After they arrived to base they were ordered to
standby. After the unit changed into camouflage battle uniforms they were
ordered to wear red berets that are part of the dress uniform. At 11:30 the unit
was transported to Bartolomejska Street station where the members were briefed
[about the operation]. This briefing began at 01:45 PM and was conducted by
three STB officers in civilian clothes, who also directed the unit's operational
response in the vicinity of National Theatre – at the time when the
demonstration began three kilometers away. This police intervention unit was
briefed with large-scale pictures on the operational plan of closing down the
National Theatre and the use of armored carriers with blades. This unit was
instructed that STB officers would show them already marked people from the
demonstration that the unit was to capture and arrest. The URNA unit is trained
for quick response operations and not for ordinary public safety work. Colonel
Becvar, who ordered this special unit into action during the demonstrations, had
to know how this unit was to respond. He also had to know that using such unit
for crowd control was unnecessary and not in accordance with law and the
internal regulationsof the Czechoslovak Federal Interior Ministry. The URNA unit
was only to be used at the times of public endangerment or against organized,
armed resistance. Nothing of a kind was expected to happen on National
Boulevard. Colonel Becvar was promoted to his post by Hegenbart himself, so it
is possible that Becvar didn't issue the “illegal” order to use URNA on his own.
Somewhere in this scandal lies the real reason Becvar shot himself.
E) During the
afternoon hours the entire leadership of Charter 77 left Prague including their
families. The only people that remained in Prague were Uhl, Benda and Nemcova.
Possibly there was a danger for them being arrested if Hegenbart was not able to
paralyze all counter-measures of the leading members of the Central Committee of
CzCP and the Federal Ministry of Interior – who had no knowledge of the
operation and its true purpose.
These Charter
77 leaders all returned to Prague on Saturday noon. During that time and
throughout Sunday Hegenbart was once and for all able to remove the danger of a
counter-stroke by the Communist Party Militia that was mobilized by Jakes. The
operational objective of the November 17 provocation was not only to remove
Jakes from power, but also to initiate a tactical retreat of the communists to
prepared positions. This tactical retreat and its hidden mechanism was the
subject of negotiations between [Moscow’s handpicked] communist leaders and the
Revival Socialism group, beginning in January 1989. At that time Hegenbart began
mobilizing actors, musicians and others to petition for the release of Havel
from jail. All the initiators of the revolution were communists or agents of
the secret police.
From the list
of students who were active in preparing the protest demonstrations and who
later assumed leadership in the student organizations, we find that they were
solely the children of prominent parents. Eighty percent of these students had
parents at senior levels of the CzCP, Federal Ministry of Interior, Foreign
Ministry, or they were general directors in state-owned enterprises, college
professors and so on. The slogans chosen for the protest were already inscribed
in June 1989: “We are not like them,” “We don’t want any violence,” and
variations on the theme. These slogans signaled that no violence would be used
against the communists [a condition of the transfer of power] and further
guarantees were supplied directly by the students and Civic Forum.
Coming
Next Week: Part Three |